This study identifies factors exogenous to individual insurers that are statistically related to the overall rate of life-health insurer insolvencies. This is a departure from the methodologies of prior studies, which have focused primarily on firm-specific characteristics in assessing insolvency risk. Empirical analysis is based on quarterly data from 1972 through 1994. Results indicate that life-health insurer insolvencies are positively related to increases in long-term interest rates, personal income, unemployment, the stock market, and to the number of insurers, and negatively related to real estate returns. Findings support the hypothesis that economic and market variables are important predictors of life-health insurer failure rates.
INTRODUCTION
Life-health insurer insolvency adversely affects various stakeholders (e.g., policyholders, beneficiaries, investors) as well as capital markets, since the insurance industry is a major supplier of funds. While life-health insurers face risks similar to those risks faced by other financial intermediaries (e.g., interest rate, liquidity, and credit), previous research primarily has focused on identifying financial statement variables and insurer-specific ratios to employ as regressors in empirical models to differentiate between low-and high-risk insurers. Although market conditions affect firms to varying degrees, the overall economic environment's impact on the number and size of insolvencies in an industry is potentially significant. Recent experience in the savings and loan industry suggests that exogenous factors have significant implications for the viability of firms in financial services industries.
Early identification of insurers at risk of failure is essential to minimize the burden placed on state insurance guaranty funds and the perceived need to protect the pub-lic against the consequences of insolvency. While prior insolvency studies have attempted to identify particular insurers in financial distress, comparatively little research has identified economic and market conditions that increase the probability of insolvency for all insurers. Figure 1 depicts the life-health insurer insolvency rate in each quarter from 1972 through 1994. The figure shows that during the period 1972 to 1989 the insolvency rate was relatively low, except during 1983, and there was little variation in the rate of insolvencies that occurred between quarters. The insolvency rate began to increase sharply in 1989.
The goal of the study is to identify factors that are exogenous to individual life-health insurers that increase their susceptibility to insolvency. Previous studies on life-health insurer insolvency largely have focused on firm-specific factors associated with an increased likelihood of bankruptcy (e.g., see Carson and Hoyt, 1995) . However, conditions that are exogenous to the firm may increase the likelihood of financial distress.
The theory of bank and insurer capital structure and default risk posits franchise value (Harrington and Danzon, 1994) as a disincentive for excessive risk taking by firms despite limited liability and guaranty funds. The presence of limited liability creates incentives for insurers to implement riskier underwriting and investment strategies than would otherwise be warranted. Firms with relatively little capital are particularly likely to pursue riskier strategies. If limited liability results in increased risk taking and, thereby, in an increased likelihood of insolvencies, then the probability of insolvency will depend on factors external to the insurer. Factors that affect the success of risky investment strategies and risky underwriting likely will affect the solvency of insurers.
An often-cited function of insurance regulation is to monitor the solvency of insurers. Regulation to prevent insolvencies takes several forms, including minimum capital and surplus requirements, risk-based capital requirements, rate regulation, requirements that annual statements be filed with regulatory authorities, and the periodic examination of the books and records of insurers. In addition, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) employs the Insurance Regulatory Information System (IRIS) ratios and the Financial Analysis and Surveillance Tracking (FAST) system. Identifying and understanding those conditions external to the firm that may increase the likelihood of insolvency should aid regulators in detecting, as early as possible, troubled insurers. In addition, increased understanding of life-health insurer insolvency should aid in regulators' choice of means of regulatory intervention to prevent the failure of marginal firms. Understanding the determinants of insolvency is also important to consumers, agents, insurers, and managers of insurers.
In the next section the literature on insolvency is reviewed. Based on theory and on previous research, hypotheses are developed for economic factors that likely are related to the probability of insurer failure. The hypotheses of the study are empirically tested, and results are presented. The article concludes with a review of the major findings and a discussion of their implications for solvency surveillance, regulation, and insurer management. 72 73  74  75  76  77  78  79  80  81  82  83  84  85  86  87  88  89  90  91  92  93  94 Quarter/Year Cummins (1988) and Brewer et al. (1997) discuss default insurance and the attendant moral hazard problem, in that the limited liability that owners of insured financial institutions enjoy encourages risk-taking behavior that would not be profitmaximizing for the firm in the absence of default insurance, e.g., investing in higherrisk investments. To minimize the potential for insolvency, government regulators require that financial institutions maintain a certain prescribed level of capital. This capital acts as a buffer against loss and to some extent, together with the incentive for safety provided by firm franchise value, discourages owners from taking excessive risks that may increase the probability of insolvency.
PRIOR INSOLVENCY RESEARCH
Empirical models employing MDA and logistic regression have been used widely in insurer solvency research. The literature on insurer financial distress is reviewed by BarNiv and McDonald (1992) and Willenborg (1992) . Cummins, Harrington, and Klein (1995) found that the ability of the NAIC risk-based capital ratio to predict insolvency for property-liability insurers is low when used in isolation, but improves significantly when variables for firm size and organizational form are included. Carson and Hoyt (1995) found that surplus and leverage measures are strong indicators of insurer financial strength, and also found a slightly higher risk of failure among stock insurers than mutual insurers. While Browne and Hoyt (1995) illustrated the importance of exogenous economic factors for the property-liability insurance industry, little evidence has been presented for the life-health insurance industry. The studies discussed above generally attempted to identify insurers in financial distress by developing empirical models that focus on the operating characteristics of particular insurers as opposed to the economic environment in which the firms operate.
In a study examining the relationship between insurance market conditions and insolvencies, A.M. Best (1992) found that the number of insolvencies is correlated with the accident and health underwriting cycle (lagged one to three years). The increased number of insolvencies is also correlated with increases in interest rates and with the life-health insurance industry's focus on investment-related products. The Best study did not examine the various economic factors in a multivariate framework, thus precluding the ability to identify the relative significance of the individual factors.
HYPOTHESES FOR LIFE-HEALTH INSURER INSOLVENCY
Prior studies of insurance company financial operations, including those by Cummins (1991) , Browne and Hoyt (1995) , Kazenski, Scoles, and Feldhaus (1995) , and Grace and Hotchkiss (1995) , suggest that economic factors are significantly related to insurer financial performance. These factors are associated with disintermediation (interest rates, economic, and employment conditions), returns on insurer investments (bonds, stocks, and real estate), and competition. Life-health insurer insolvency is hypothesized to be related to several factors exogenous to individual insurers. This section describes various economic and market factors and their expected relationship to the probability of insolvency.
Disintermediation
Interest Rates. Changes in interest rates have a direct impact on the value of insurers. As interest rates decline, the value of bonds in an insurer's portfolio increases, and vice versa. Staking and Babbel (1995) note that one way insurers incur risk with their financial portfolio is by holding assets with a longer duration than their liabilities. This mismatch creates an interest rate risk since the magnitude of the change in the value of assets will be greater than that of liabilities when interest rates move. When interest rates decrease, insurers with this duration mismatch experience an increase in surplus. On the other hand, an increase in interest rates leads to a larger decline in the value of assets than liabilities, and thus a decrease in surplus. Colquitt and Hoyt (1997) document a positive asset/liability maturity mismatch for the majority of lifehealth insurers in their sample. The asset/liability mismatch results in increased leverage and a greater probability of insolvency for the insurer (Carson and Hoyt, 1995) . As a result, changes in short-term interest rates are expected to be positively related to the insolvency rate.
Differences in asset and liability durations should be interpreted as only a possible indication of exposure to interest rate risk since insurers can cover current obligations as they become due by using cash, including premium income and other assets. If insurers have sufficient funds from current operations (investment earnings, investment turnover, and premiums collected) to offset current obligations, then the effect of an interest rate change on the insolvency rate may be relatively insignificant.
The level of long-term interest rates may be related to the rate of insolvencies. Since interest earnings are a significant source of revenue for insurers, companies are more likely to remain solvent when interest earnings are high. High interest earnings are generally indicative of favorable investment experience for insurers. Thus, the level of interest rates is a proxy for investment earnings for insurers. Higher investment earnings will facilitate insurers meeting their obligations to policyholders. In this case, interest rates are hypothesized to be negatively related to the insolvency rate.
To the extent that interest earnings are credited back to insureds through lower premiums or higher policy returns, the effect of interest earnings on solvency will be reduced.
1 Alternatively, high market interest rates likely result in greater disintermediation for life-health insurers in the form of policy loans (Carson and Hoyt, 1992) and guaranteed investment contract withdrawals (Carson and Scott, 1996) . In addition, the interest rate hypothesis suggests that higher interest rates are likely to be related to policy surrenders (Cummins, 1973; Outreville, 1990) . That is, when the value of insurers' assets is decreased due to higher interest rates, disintermediation also may increase, thus leading to a liquidity crisis for life-health insurers. In this case, interest rates would be positively related to the insolvency rate. Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991) provide empirical evidence that the slope of the yield curve may contain useful information about the future prospects of the economy. The expectations hypothesis suggests that long-term interest rates decline before an anticipated recession in order to equalize holding-period returns. Inasmuch as the performance of life-health insurers may be related to the state of the economy, important predictors of the economy may be related to insurer solvency. If insurer insolvency is more likely during recessionary periods (when the yield curve is flatter or inverted), then the slope of the yield curve is expected to be negatively related to the probability of insolvency.
Disposable Personal Income Per Capita. Life-health insurance sales are positively related to personal income, and policy surrenders are negatively related to personal income. Thus, when personal income is relatively high, cash flows to insurers are likely to increase and disintermediation is likely to be relatively low. Thus, personal income is expected to be negatively related to the probability of life-health insurer insolvency. Conversely, increased sales result in greater leverage and a drain on surplus, and an alternative hypothesis is that personal income is positively related to insolvency.
Unemployment. Recessionary periods are likely to affect life-health insurer cash flow in that life insurance purchases are more discretionary than auto and homeowners insurance purchases. In addition, the emergency fund hypothesis suggests that policy surrenders are likely to increase during periods of economic duress. Hoyt (1994) provides evidence that disintermediation in the form of policy surrender activity was directly related to unemployment. Widespread increases in surrender activity also may be accompanied by a decrease in new sales, thereby exacerbating the decrease in insurer liquidity. Thus, high unemployment is likely to be associated with a higher incidence of life-health insurer insolvency.
Returns on Insurer Investments
Real Estate Returns. Life-health insurers generally hold a portion of their investment portfolios in real estate. As witnessed by events in the early part of the 1990s, real estate can have a debilitating effect on the financial soundness of an insurer as real estate values decline. Conversely, a strong real estate market can produce high returns for insurers. Thus, as total investment returns on real estate increase, the probability of life-health insurer insolvency is expected to decrease, and vice versa.
Stock Returns. Life-health insurer investment portfolios typically contain a relatively small proportion of stocks. Thus, as stock returns increase, the return on insurer's portfolios increases, and the probability of insolvency may decrease. An alternative hypothesis is based on the fact that holders of life insurance policies have the option to take policy loans or surrender their policies. As returns from alternative investments become more attractive, disintermediation in the form of policy surrenders (Outreville, 1990) or policy loans (Carson and Hoyt, 1992) increases. The negative correlation between rates on alternative investments and insurer cash flows represents a liquidity risk for life-health insurers. Thus, as a result of disintermediation, stock returns are expected to be positively related to life-health insurer insolvency. The introduction of variable policy loan rates and the popularity of variable life insurance in the mid-1980s could serve to mitigate such disintermediation.
Unanticipated Inflation. Unanticipated inflation may increase the insolvency rate. Real returns on fixed-rate bonds are lower than expected when unanticipated inflation is high, and profit margins are lower than expected. This will place a financial strain on insurers which will increase the likelihood of insolvencies. Thus, unanticipated inflation is expected to be positively associated with the risk of insolvency.
Competition/Regulation
Number of Insurers. The insolvency rate during a quarter is hypothesized to be positively related to the number of insurers for several reasons. The number of companies may serve as a proxy for the degree of competition in the insurance market (Munch and Smallwood, 1980) , and increased competition could contribute to an increase in the rate of insolvency: competitive bidding may result in a "winner's curse" that is positively related to the number of bidders (Harrington and Danzon, 1994) . The hypotheses of the study are summarized in Table 1 . 
Competition/ Regulation
Number of insurers N +
Control Variables
Second quarter dummy Q2 + Time TIME + / -
SAMPLE, DATA, AND EMPIRICAL MODEL
The preceding section presented hypotheses relating to possible economic and market predictors of insurer insolvencies. This section describes the sample, data, and empirical model used to test the hypotheses of the study.
Sample
For the purposes of the study, an insolvency is defined as the involuntary retirement of an insurer, including companies that were ordered to liquidate, were placed in receivership, or were placed in conservatorship (A.M. Best, annual).
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Since, over time, a particular insolvent insurer could be placed in more than one of the above categories, the first date of activity in any of the categories is used to assign insolvent insurers to particular quarters. For example, an insurer might first be placed in conservatorship and then several months later be placed in liquidation. In this case, the insurer would be classed as insolvent on the date that it was placed in conservatorship. Data on life-health insurer insolvencies regarding the time of the first official action taken by state insurance departments were obtained directly from A.M. Best and from various issues (from 1972 to 1995) of Best's Review (Life-Health Edition).
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The tally of insolvent insurers excludes mergers, which could bias the results if an insurer that is nearly insolvent is taken over. It appears reasonable to assume that most target insurers had adequate residual value in order to attract takeover interest.
Data
The Appendix reports the sources of the data used in the analysis. The analysis uses quarterly data for the period from the first quarter of 1972 through the last quarter of 1994. 4 Given the time series nature of the data, non-stationarity of the variables is a potential problem in estimating a regression model. We explicitly test our data for nonstationarity, or the presence of unit roots, by using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test, including an intercept and a trend term. Further, we inspect the correlogram for each series as an additional test for non-stationarity. If these tests provide evidence that a data series is non-stationary, then we difference the series and retest until we identify 2 Insolvency rates are based on the number of companies becoming insolvent rather than the number of groups since this appears to be the proper exposure unit for insolvency. Neither the group nor other members of the group are necessarily responsible for the insolvency costs of one of the affiliated companies. Prior insolvency studies have utilized companies as the unit of exposure as well. A similar approach for defining insolvencies has been used in prior studies of insurer failures. 3 We do not distinguish insurers by line-of-business. Best (1992) observed that many insolvencies in the period 1989 to 1991 were among small health insurers. During that period, insolvent insurers in our sample were firms that wrote primarily life insurance (54 percent), health insurance (34 percent), and annuities (12 percent). These percentages were consistent both for frequency of insolvency and for insolvency by premium volume. These percentages are for all insurers that became insolvent that had (pre-insolvency) available premium data from Best's Reports (from 1987 through 1989). Thus, although Best observed that many of the insolvent insurers during the period from 1989 through 1991 were small health insurers, these insurers still represented just one-third of the total insolvencies during that period. Unfortunately, because of data limitations, we are unable to calculate the relative mix of life, health, and annuity insurers over the entire period of the study. As a result, we are unable to subdivide our insolvent insurer sample by line-of-business. It is possible that the relation between the economic variables and the insolvency rate varies systematically by line-ofbusiness. However, we are unable to explore this issue with the data that are available to us. 4 The first and second quarters of 1972 are lost because of the differencing required to achieve stationarity of all data series.
an appropriate differencing to achieve stationarity. ADF tests suggest that four of the variables described in Table 1 were non-stationary (AAAAVG, YCURVE, UNEMP, and S&P). The first variable (AAAAVG) is stationary in second differences, while the other three variables are stationary in first differences. All other variables are stationary as specified in Table 1 . Table 2 reports summary statistics for each of the variables after appropriate differencing of the non-stationary variables. Number of quarter (3-92)* TIME 47.500 26.125 ∆ is the difference operator. ∆ 2 is the second difference operator. * Observations 1 and 2 are lost due to the differencing required to achieve stationarity of all data series.
The change in interest rate variable, TB3CHG t , is calculated as the change in the threemonth Treasury bill rate from quarter t-1 to quarter t. The Treasury bill rate is chosen for this variable since the variable is intended to capture the impact of duration mismatch by insurers. Hence, a short-term, risk-free rate such as the Treasury bill rate appears appropriate. The interest rate variable, AAAAVG t , is equal to the arithmetic average yield on AAA corporate bonds over the current quarter and the 11 preceding quarters. This measure is chosen since the purpose of the variable is to provide a proxy for the earnings on insurers' investment portfolios. The AAA bond yield is chosen because it is highly correlated with overall yields on insurers' investment portfolios which are heavily weighted toward bonds.
The measure of unanticipated inflation is equal to the nominal rate of inflation over the past three years minus the three-year Treasury yield at the beginning of the threeyear period. This measure is based on the assumption that the risk-free rate incorporates expectations of inflation over the upcoming period. A similar measure is discussed in Browne and Hoyt (1995) .
An insurance company is first recognized as being insolvent at the time of regulatory intervention. Since annual reports must be filed with state insurance commissioners during the first quarter of the year, regulatory action is not likely to occur until after the first quarter. Further, insolvent companies may reveal themselves after the first quarter by failing to file the required financial statements. Thus, other things being equal, and given a relatively quick identification of financially impaired insurers, the insolvency rate is hypothesized to be greatest during the second quarter of the year. A dummy variable, Q2, is included in the model to account for this likely seasonal variation in insolvency detection. In addition, some variation over the sample period may have occurred. To account for such possible changes, a control variable, TIME, is included in the model.
Empirical Model
The insolvency data used in the study are count data. The Poisson probability distribution is often used to model infrequent events with count data. As observed by Green (1993, p. 676) , although count data could be analyzed using multiple linear regression, the preponderance of zeros and small values and the discrete nature of the dependent variable suggests that Poisson regression would be more appropriate than ordinary least squares.
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The Poisson regression model can be written as:
x is the expected value of the number of occurrences, x is the vector of explanatory variables, and N(x) is the known population in which the occurrences happen. The rate of occurrences is expressed as λ µ ( ) ( ) ( )
The Poisson regression is commonly presented as a log-linear model (see Hausman et al., 1984; and Singal, 1997) : 5 We believe that the nature of the data, count data, justifies the use of Poisson regression for estimating equation (1). However, given the time-series nature of the data, econometric issues, such as autocorrelation and non-stationarity, cannot be ignored. The data series are tested for non-stationarity using Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests as described above, and appropriate differencing of the series is used to achieve stationarity if necessary. Since most of the time-series related diagnostic tests are not available within the Poisson regression model, we estimate the model again using ordinary least squares (OLS) with the dependent variable being defined as the number of insolvencies. This model allows us to explicitly test for potential heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation, multicollinearity, and problems with outliers. In the OLS model we use inspection of the correlation matrix, condition indices, and variance inflation factors to evaluate potential collinearity problems. We compute Durbin-Watson, BoxPierce, and Box-Ljung statistics to test for potential autocorrelation. We test and control for heteroscedasticity using White and Newey-West estimators, and the asymptotically consistent covariances. Finally, we test for influential observations (outliers) using the influence diagnostics described by Belsley, Kuh, and Welsh (1980) . The modeling that we do in the OLS framework serves to evaluate the robustness of our Poisson model to these potential econometric problems. The results of our robustness tests are presented in footnote 6. The log-likelihood function can be written as:
where n t is the number of occurrences in period t, N t is a measure of scale, and X t is a vector of independent variables. In this study, the dependent variable or response variable, n t , is the number of insurers that became insolvent in quarter t, and N t is the number of insurers in business at the beginning of quarter t. After appropriate differencing of variables to achieve stationarity, the regression specification which relates the hypothesized predictor variables to the number of insolvencies is represented as:
where
INSOLV t (n t ) = the number of insolvencies in quarter t, ∆ 2 (AAAAVG) t = the second difference of the arithmetic average of the AAA bond rate during quarter t and the 11 preceding quarters, ∆(YCURVE) t = the first difference of the log ((1+20 year T-BOND/100) / (1+TB3/ 100)), TB3CHG t = the change in the three-month Treasury bill rate from quarter t-1 to t, ∆(∆PI) t = the first difference of disposable personal income per capita in quarter t, ∆(UNEMP) t = the first difference of the percentage of unemployed civilian workers during quarter t, REIT t = the total rate of return on real estate investment trusts during quarter t, ∆(S&P) t = the first difference of the Standard and Poor 500 index during quarter t (base year of 1970), UNANINF t = the nominal rate of inflation over the past three years minus the three-year Treasury yield at the beginning of the three-year period, N t = the total number of insurers at the beginning of quarter t, Q2 = an indicator variable which takes the value of 1 if time period t is the second quarter of the calendar year and 0 otherwise, TIME t = a control variable, equal to the number of each quarter examined (3 through 92), to account for possible changes over time, and e t = the error term. Table 3 is the correlation matrix for the variables described in equation (1), and Table  4 reports the estimated parameters of equation (1). 6, 7 While there is a tradeoff between the average bond yield and the "new money" marginal bond yield, life-health insurer insolvencies are significantly higher during periods of increases in long-term interest earnings. The interest rate variable supports the interest rate hypothesis that insurers are more likely to face disintermediation and to become insolvent during periods of increases in long-term interest rates.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Findings indicate that the change in personal income is significant and positively related to life-health insurer insolvency. Life-health insurance sales are positively related to increases in personal income, and increased sales result in greater leverage and a drain on surplus. This induced financial strain may lead to a greater probability of insolvency.
Life-health insurer insolvency is significantly and positively related to increases in unemployment. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that greater disintermediation (in the form of policy surrenders and policy loans) occurs during periods of increasing unemployment and provides support for the emergency fund hypothesis.
The results suggest that the life-health insurer insolvency rate over the sample period is negatively related to returns on real estate investments. This result confirms the anecdotal evidence of problem real estate investments contributing to life-health insurer insolvencies. On the other hand, the failure rate over this period is positively 6 The OLS model using the variables described in equation (1) was estimated to evaluate the effect of potential time-series related problems. Although several of the correlations between the independent variables are statistically significant, variance inflation factors and condition indices in the OLS model did not suggest the presence of multicollinearity. One observation was flagged as being influential. This observation is the quarter in which a record number of insolvencies (30) occurred. Re-estimating the model with this influential variable omitted does not qualitatively alter the results, so the observation was retained in the models (Poisson and OLS). Box-Pierce and Box-Ljung statistics provide evidence of autocorrelation at lags of 1, 4, and 8. However, the Newey-West estimators were used to produce autocorrelation consistent standard errors which were in turn used to compute significance levels. In both cases the results were qualitatively similar to those obtained in OLS without adjustment and to the results obtained from Poisson regression. The HET command available in the Poisson regression procedure in LIMDEP 7.0 was used to control for potential heterogeneity in that model. 7 We test for specification errors by using the likelihood ratio (LR) test described by Gujarati (1995, p. 280) . We performed a series of LR tests between our full model given in Table 4 and models with all possible combinations of the insignificant coefficients set equal to zero. The hypotheses that the variables, ∆(YCURVE), TB3CHG, UNANINF, and all combinations of these variables, have no effect on the number of life-health insurer insolvencies cannot be rejected (smallest p-value is 0.77). However, the results on the significant variables are virtually unaffected by any of these alternative specifications. Further, as reported in footnote 6, tests of the full model provide no evidence of multicollinearity. Given our theoretical arguments for the relevance of all of the variables in the full model and the invariance of our results to changes in the specification of the model, we do not believe that overspecification is affecting our inferences. An increase in the number of life-health insurers increases the probability of insolvency. This result suggests that, in part, the increase in the insolvency rate since 1972 is attributable to the increase in the number of insurers. 8 Results are consistent with the hypothesis that an increase in the number of insurers is likely to lead to greater frequency of insolvency, especially if the number of insurers increases because of relaxed regulatory requirements, such as minimum capital and surplus requirements that do not keep pace with inflation. This finding is consistent with Browne and Hoyt (1995) , who provide evidence that the importance of minimum capital and surplus requirements has been eroded by inflation over time.
Results for the dummy variable to account for likely seasonal variation in the identification of insurer insolvency, Q2, indicate that the insolvency rate for life-health insurers is significantly higher in the second quarter. Of all the quarters, the frequency Pseudo-R 2 = 26.6%
8 As an indication of this relation between the insolvency rate and the number of insurers, the failure rate in 1972 was 3.4 per 1,000 with 1,765 insurers in business at the beginning of the year. In 1989, when 2,343 were in business, the failure rate climbed to 19.2 per 1,000. In 1994 the failure rate dropped to 2.7 per 1,000 with 1,844 insurers operating at the beginning of the year. Continued consolidation among life-health insurers and financial services providers likely portends a further decrease in the life-health insurer insolvency rate.
of life-health insurer insolvency was lowest in the first quarter and highest in the second quarter. This univariate relationship is confirmed in our multivariate model.
The control variable TIME is significant and positive, indicating an increasing rate of insolvencies during the sample period. Results for the remaining variables (∆(YCURVE), TB3CHG, and UNANINF) are not statistically significant.
CONCLUSIONS
Studies of insolvency in the life-health insurance industry traditionally have focused on identifying important predictor variables for identifying insurers at higher risk of insolvency. Rather than focus on these variables, this study tests whether there is a relationship between the rate of insolvency in the industry and temporal market conditions. Browne and Hoyt (1995) found that property-liability insolvencies were positively related to the number of insurers and the combined ratio, and that insolvencies were first reported predominantly in the first quarter of each year. The present study finds that life-health insurer insolvencies are positively related to increases in the average yield on long-term interest rates, personal income per capita, unemployment, the stock market, and to the number of insurers, and negatively related to real estate returns. Whereas Browne and Hoyt (1995) found evidence of increased failures in the first quarter of the year for property-liability insurers, we find evidence of a seasonal pattern of insolvencies among life-health insurers, which is highest in the second quarter of the year.
Insurance executives are becoming increasingly aware of the interrelated nature of the financial decisions that they must make in managing their firms. Product line mix, asset allocation, and capital structure decisions interact with one another and with economic and market factors to determine the ultimate financial performance of the insurer. The economic and market factors identified in this study are likely to be important to insurer managers, even of large, relatively stable insurers, to build dynamic financial models for their own firms.
Lastly, as discussed previously, most studies of insurer insolvency have focused on identifying operating characteristics of individual insurers that are predictive of insolvency. The findings of the present study suggest that exogenous factors such as interest rates, real estate and stock market returns, personal income, unemployment, and the overall number of insurers have a significant impact on life-health insurer insolvency rates. Failure to incorporate measures of general economic and industry conditions may partially explain the relatively inconsistent results that previous insurer bankruptcy studies using firm-specific characteristics have obtained.
Future studies aimed at identifying insurer-specific characteristics that are predictive of insolvency may benefit from including measures of the overall industry and economic environment. In that regard, the various macroeconomic variables from this study could be combined with insurer-specific data in future research to form a dynamic analytic model of life-health insurer financial performance. 
APPENDIX
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